Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War
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- Create Date：2022-03-18 06:54:37
- Update Date：2025-09-06
- Status：finish
- Author：Paul D'Anieri
- ISBN：1108713955
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Summary
D'Anieri explores the dynamics within Ukraine， between Ukraine and Russia， and between Russia and the West， that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually led to war in 2014。 Proceeding chronologically， this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991， at the time called a 'civilized divorce'， led to what many are now calling 'a new Cold War'。 He argues that the conflict has worsened because of three underlying factors - the security dilemma， the impact of democratization on geopolitics， and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe。 Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered， D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated pre-existing disagreements that could not be bridged， with concerning implications for the resolution of the Ukraine conflict。 The book also shows how this war fits into broader patterns of contemporary international conflict and should therefore appeal to researchers working on the Russia-Ukraine conflict， Russia's relations with the West， and conflict and geopolitics more generally。
Reviews
Mashrafi
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（It took me a long time to finish a book， it was a monumental journey。 Depression rendered me unable to do anything besides nothing）This is a great introduction to modern Ukrainian politics。 If you scroll through my 2021 Reading List， you will see that I already read a book about the history of Ukraine。 That book was very large in scope and was mainly to do with earlier Ukrainian history as opposed to the current geopolitical problems it faces。 I would characterize it as a mainly geopolitical bo （It took me a long time to finish a book， it was a monumental journey。 Depression rendered me unable to do anything besides nothing）This is a great introduction to modern Ukrainian politics。 If you scroll through my 2021 Reading List， you will see that I already read a book about the history of Ukraine。 That book was very large in scope and was mainly to do with earlier Ukrainian history as opposed to the current geopolitical problems it faces。 I would characterize it as a mainly geopolitical book about the problems Ukraine faces vis-a-vis Russia。 However， this book almost seems like a journal article。 It won't offer you any moment of peace or time to sink things in。 I plan on supplementing this book with something else。 Keep watch for some more books I will read this year related to Ukraine。 My next stop is going to be Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know® 。。。more
Timothy
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Important nowI recommend this book for anyone who wants to dig deeper into what’s happening in Ukraine。 It really explains the historical ties between Russia and Ukraine。 The sources of much of the tensions in the area。 And how the west and Russian hardliners， like Putin， view the prospect of NATO， the EU， and the rise of Democracy much differently。 The first chapter gives you a complete overview of the points made in the book of which each subsequent chapter goes into greater detail。 You’ll get Important nowI recommend this book for anyone who wants to dig deeper into what’s happening in Ukraine。 It really explains the historical ties between Russia and Ukraine。 The sources of much of the tensions in the area。 And how the west and Russian hardliners， like Putin， view the prospect of NATO， the EU， and the rise of Democracy much differently。 The first chapter gives you a complete overview of the points made in the book of which each subsequent chapter goes into greater detail。 You’ll get a little more out of this than what you’re getting from the talking heads in the media。 。。。more
Jason Friedlander
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Pretty good book on the history of Ukraine-Russia relations， especially over the past 30 years。 Well worth a read for anyone curious about what’s currently going on there。
Scriptor Ignotus
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Update: Lord， have mercy。At this moment， a Russian invasion of Ukraine seems virtually inevitable。 Though Russia claims no intent of “aggressive” action toward Ukraine， it is steadily amassing troops at the border and making a number of demands from NATO that the latter is unwilling to countenance and the former is unwilling to abandon。 Russia demands that the United States provide a legally-binding guarantee that Ukraine will never be permitted to join NATO， and that it limit military exercises Update: Lord， have mercy。At this moment， a Russian invasion of Ukraine seems virtually inevitable。 Though Russia claims no intent of “aggressive” action toward Ukraine， it is steadily amassing troops at the border and making a number of demands from NATO that the latter is unwilling to countenance and the former is unwilling to abandon。 Russia demands that the United States provide a legally-binding guarantee that Ukraine will never be permitted to join NATO， and that it limit military exercises in eastern NATO member states like Poland， Estonia， and Latvia。 Russia will not tolerate the permanent incorporation of Ukraine—one of the three core Slavic states， alongside Belarus and Russia itself， that formed the Soviet Union in 1922—into the NATO/EU alliance structure， while the West will not allow the membership negotiations of that structure to be “vetoed” by an external power。 Russia has long viewed the subjection of Ukraine to its own sphere of influence to be nearly as vital a national security interest as if Ukraine were Russian territory; which， of course， it was from the eighteenth century until 1991， though less formally so during the Soviet era。 Conversely， even the most Russophilic Ukrainian politicians have been consistently adamant in their assertions of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity; and according to survey data， a majority of the population supports greater cooperation with the EU， even after—or perhaps especially after—the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014 and its continued support for separatists in the Donbas。 With no obvious resolution in sight and the perception of high stakes by all sides， Europe appears to be on the brink of its largest and deadliest war since 1945， with dire implications for Ukraine， Europe， NATO， and the East-West divide。 What specific goals Putin would aim to achieve with an invasion is the mystery of the hour， as Russia faced an unexpected degree of resistance in eastern Ukraine during its 2014 incursion and would only face more if it pushed further westward and attempted a prolonged occupation of a wide swath of a country of some 40 million people。 Putin may want to further inflame eastern separatism， continuing a strategy of carving out pro-Russian exclaves in former Soviet countries which it employed in Moldova in 1992 and Georgia in 2008; or he may want a formal partition of Ukraine， which would necessitate a larger-scale invasion。 Any more ambitious effort to seize all of Ukraine is unlikely to succeed but cannot be ruled out given the desperation felt in Russia at the likely prospect of an historically-crucial strategic asset swinging out of its orbit。 Paul D’Anieri provides a satisfactory primer on the historical roots of the Ukraine-Russia conflict， as well as on the issues at stake both within Ukraine and internationally， that will be helpful for a general readership seeking to better understand ongoing events。 What he does not provide， however， is consolation。 This account emphasizes the fact that the seeds of the present crisis—incompatible perceptions between the West and Russia regarding the post-cold war European security structure， and consequent disagreements about which side was violating the new status quo; the tug-of-war between Russia and Ukraine over the status of Crimea， Sevastopol， and the Black Sea fleet; Russia’s desire to retain its influence over Eastern Europe; and the Western assumption of a united and democratic European future—were all present in nascent form even before the USSR was formally dissolved; and over the past thirty years they have all converged into a Gordian knot that has gradually tightened around Ukraine。 In 1989， as the Cold War was thawing and Germany was reunifying， George H。W。 Bush spoke of a “Europe whole and free，” comprised of a constellation of liberal-democratic nation-states integrated within a continental economic union， while Mikhail Gorbachev described “Europe as a common home，” wherein Russia would retain its great power status as the leader of a reformed （but not eliminated） Eastern Bloc。 Twenty-five years later， these mutually incompatible visions would both be considered as axiomatic as ever by their respective advocates， and their inevitable collision would cut through Ukraine like a buzzsaw。 The European Union would see itself as a voluntary partnership of independent states that could incorporate new members based on the consent of their people， while Russia would view it from the outside as a monolithic power bloc that sponsored color revolutions within the former Warsaw Pact with the cynical aim of advancing the frontiers of the new European Empire—the successor of Hitler and Napoleon—and seeking ultimately to overthrow the government of Russia itself。 Russia would attempt to deter NATO and EU expansion by its opposition to the NATO campaign against Serbia in the 1990s and its 2008 war with Georgia， but rather than affirming Russia’s veto power over European affairs， as it hoped， this would only increase the urgency with which Eastern Europe sought integration into the Western system， further alienating Russia。 Add to this lethal brew the inevitable conflation of domestic political systems and geopolitical alignments， and the mere exercise of popular sovereignty in Ukraine， either in the form of elections or mass uprisings， would become an acute source of international conflict。 Thus it is easy to see how the Gordian knot is being pulled ever tighter， but lamentably difficult to imagine how it might be undone—except by the sword。 。。。more
Fabian Modin
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